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RECENT DECISIONS
mation actions, regardless of whether the identity of the sources is
in any way required by the plaintiff to prove his cause of action. 1
Under the statute, the testimony which would be compelled in
criminal cases and civil actions, other than those specifically ex-
cluded, would be that for which there exists a "compelling and
overriding national interest which cannot be served by an alterna-
tive means." What considerations, if any, went into the selection
of the Caldwell wording, rather than that which the Wisconsin
court used, cannot be determined. What is significant, however, is
that the proposed statute, like the Knops holding itself, makes no
differentiation in terms of how the privilege will be applied to var-
ious degress of criminal conduct, thereby providing no greater
guideline.
CONCLUSION
While the case of State v. Knops will stand as a landmark
decision in terms of its interpretation of the first amendment guar-
antee of freedom of the press, there still remain many unanswered
questions concerning application of the privilege. When will a
"compelling need" for knowledge of the source of information be
deemed to exist? Will this be determined according to the court's
estimation of the overall value of the information to the public?
Will the state always have a "compelling interest" in any evidence
relative to the prosecution of criminal activity, regardless of how
minor the particular charges might be? The result of this uncer-
tainty is a situation wherein lower courts, newsmen, and, most
importantly, confidential news sources are left in substantial doubt
as to how the privilege will be applied in their particular cases-a
doubt uncleared by any legislation that has, thus far, been proposed
in this state.
JAMES A. BAXTER
Evidence: The Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law: Evi-
dentiary Limitations-In 1969, the Wisconsin Legislature passed
what is now referred to as the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance
Control Law.I This enactment is patterned after a similar provision
31. See note 24 supra.
1. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 427; Wis. STAT. §§ 968.28-.34 (1969).
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in the United States Code 2 and follows the intent of The American
Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal Jus-
tice, Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance.3 The new law
is an attempt to codify the exact procedures to be followed by law
enforcement officers in the use of electronic surveillance tech-
niques.' The statutes provide detailed instructions for the procure-
ment of the necessary authorization for the interception of oral and
wire communications. In addition, they list the circumstances
under which this authorization will be granted. Finally, they pro-
vide evidentiary sanctions as well as a civil cause of action and
criminal penalties for noncompliance.
State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of Rock County' is the
first statement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in interpretation
of the new law. Dealing primarily with the admissability into evi-
dence of certain tape recordings obtained with the consent of one
of the parties to several conversations, the case indicates that the
statutes dealing with this subject will be strictly construed.
The action began as a petition for a writ of prohibition entered
with the permission of the supreme court. The relator, George
Arnold, sought to restrain the county court of Rock County from
receiving into evidence tape recorded conversations to which he was
a party.6 Arnold was the secretary and executive director of the
Beloit Housing Authority. On August 28, 1970, he had conversa-
tions with Robert Lockhart, a Beloit contractor who had been the
accepted bidder for 75 low cost housing units to be constructed in
Beloit. The Rock County Sheriff's Department intercepted these
conversations by means of microphones wired to a recording mech-
anism. "Lockhart gave his written consent for these electronic in-
terceptions but Arnold had no knowledge of them and did not
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
3. Approved Draft, 1968 [hereinafter referred to as Standards].
4. The introduction to Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 427 states that the purpose of the legislation
is "to prohibit electronic surveillance by persons other than law enforcement officers duly
authorized by court order and engaged in the investigation or prevention of specific catego-
ries of offenses .... "
5. 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971).
6. Id. The court held that nonjurisdictional error is a proper ground for issuance of the
writ when the appeal comes too late for effective redress or is inadequate, when there is need
for such intervention to avoid great hardship or the complete denial of the rights of the
litigant, or when there is presented a question of great and immediate public concern, citing:
State ex rel. Schulter v. Roraff, 39 Wis. 2d 342, 159 N.W.2d 25 (1968); State ex rel. Gaynor
v. Krueger, 31 Wis. 2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966); State ex rel. Sucher v. County Court,
16 Wis. 2d 565, 115 N.W.2d 611 (1962); Drugsvold v. Small Claims Court, 13 Wis. 2d 228,
108 N.W.2d 648 (1961).
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consent thereto."' 7 Arnold was subsequently arrested and charged
with accepting a bribe contrary to Wisconsin Statutes section
946.10(2) and with misconduct in public office contrary to Wiscon-
sin Statutes section 946.12(2). When his pretrial motion to suppress
the tapes was denied, this original action followed.
The defense had objected to the admission of the recordings,
alleging that they constituted an unreasonable search and seizure
in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. The state had contended that the interception
of the oral communications was lawful under Wisconsin Statutes
section 968.3 1(2)(b) and, therefore, that the resultant tapes were
admissible in evidence.' Thus the issue presented to the court was
whether or not recorded conversations obtained with the consent of
one of the parties, but without court authorization, are admissible
in evidence against the other (non-consenting) party.
In deciding the constitutional question of whether or not the
interception was an unreasonable search, the majority quoted and
relied iipon the United States Supreme Court decision in United
States v. White.9 The court pointed out the holding in White that
electronic eavesdropping was permissible under the fourth amend-
ment in that case, on the ground that the defendant had no justifi-
able expectation that his conversation would not be reported ver-
bally, and, therefore, that it would not be recorded by, or with the
consent of, the other party. But the Wisconsin court took pains to
point out that the decision in White was a 5-4 decision and that the
majority in that case could not agree on a single opinion.10 How-
ever, the court went on to deny the admissibility of the tapes in
Arnold on two non-constitutional grounds.
First, the court stated that Arnold's conversations were privi-
leged by statute and that their admission into evidence would be in
7. Id. at 437, 187 N.W.2d at 357.
8. WIs. STAT. § 968.31(2)(b) (1969) provides that it is not unlawful under §§ 968.28
to 968.34 (The Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law) "for a person acting under
color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception."
9. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
10. 51 Wis. 2d at 439, 187 N.W.2d at 357. Specifically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
said: "While this case is not satisfactory because of the diversity in its opinions, the disagree-
ment on what the Court's prior decisions meant and the plurality holding, nevertheless, it
controls, for the time being at least, the issue of constitutionality raised in this case."
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violation of the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law."
In coming to this conclusion, the court seems to have adopted a
broad definition of the word "privilege" as used in the surveillance
statutes. In the Standards, a provision identical to the Wisconsin
section on privilege is discussed.' 2 However, in the comment follow-
ing this standard, there is a lengthy discussion of the traditional
legally recognized areas of privilege: attorney-client, physician-
patient, and priest-penitent.' 3 It is clearly the intent of the
Standards to use the word in its traditional legal sense. A study of
past cases reveals that the Wisconsin courts have always used this
definition of privilege and privileged communications. 4 In addi-
tion, the definition of privileged communications and the applica-
tion of the privilege rule is a matter of statutory law in this state. 5
The court appears to have redefined the concept of privilege in
terms of the surveillance law to broaden the enactment's
protection."6
Second, the court went into an elaborate discussion of the perti-
nent provisions of the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control
Law itself. The opinion described the statutory provision which
authorizes electronic eavesdropping. 17 Section 968.28 provides in
some detail for the application for a court order prior to the inter-
ception of oral or wire communications. This section delineates the
circumstances under which the order will be granted:
1I. Wis. STAT. § 968.29(4) (1969): "No otherwise privileged wire or oral communica-
tion intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, ss. 968.28 to 968.34 or 18 U.S.C.
119, shall lose its privileged character."
12. § 5.11 (b) Privileged Communications.
13. Id., comment d. Interception of Privileged Communications:
The privilege has come to be understood to be that of a client, spouse, patient or
confidant to prevent not the interception but the disclosure of the conversation by
the testimony of a lawyer, spouse, physician or clergyman concerning confidential
communications in a legal proceeding.
14. State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971); Abraham v. State, 47 Wis.
2d 44, 176 N.W.2d 349 (1970); Alexander v. Farmer's Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 25 Wis. 2d 623,
131 N.W.2d 373 (1964).
15. WIs. STAT. §§ 885.18 (1969) (Husband and Wife), 885.20 (Confessions to Clergy-
man), 885.205 (Privileged Communication), 885.21 (Communication to Doctors), and
885.22 (Communications to Attorneys).
16. However, we think Arnold's conversations were privileged in character by
statute and their admission in evidence by means of tape recordings would be in
violation of The Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law, sec. 968.27 through
968.33, Stats.
51 Wis. 2d at 439, 187 N.W.2d at 357.
17. WIs. STAT. § 968.28 (1969). This section requires law enforcement officers to apply
for a circuit court order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral
communication.
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The authorization shall be permitted only when such interception
may provide or has provided evidence of the comrmission of the
offense of murder, kidnapping, commercial gambling, bribery,
extortion and dealing in narcotics and dangerous drugs or con-
spiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 8
The next section of the statutes includes a provision authorizing
disclosure of intercepted wire or oral communications:
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by secs.
968.28 to 968.34 or 18 USC 119 or by any like statute of any
other state, any information concerning a wire or oral communi-
cation or evidence derived therefrom intercepted in accordance
with secs. 968.28 to 968.34, may disclose the contents of that
communication or such derivative evidence only while giving tes-
timony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding in any court
or before any magistrate or grand jury in this state, or in any
federal or state grand jury proceeding. 9
In light of the above quoted sections, the remainder of the
decision in Arnold turned upon an interpretation of section
968.31 (2)(b). 20 This section provides that interception of oral or
wire communications with the consent of one of the parties by a
person acting under color of law shall not be unlawful. The major-
ity in Arnold read this section together with sections 968.28 and
968.29 to impose an evidentiary restriction:
We think the admissibility into evidence of the contents of eaves-
dropping interceptions is governed solely by sec. 968.29(3),
Stats., and only communications "intercepted in accordance
with" the state law may be disclosed by being admitted in evi-
dence. An interception by a person under color of law who inter-
cepts with the consent of one party but without the approval of
the circuit court is not "intercepted in accordance with" as re-
quired in sec. 968.29(3). Nor is such interception "any means
authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.34 . . . ." While making such
interception not unlawful, sec. 968.31(2)(b), Stats., does not
"authorize" it as a procedure which is done by sec. 968.30 requir-
ing an application for electronic surveillance to the circuit court.2'
The court reasoned that the intent of the legislature was to
18. VIs. STAT. § 968.28 (1969).
19. Wis. STAT. § 968.29(3) (1969).
20. See note 8 supra.
21. 51 Wis. 2d at 442, 187 N.W.2d at 358.
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distinguish between the terms "not unlawful" and "authorized."
By arriving at this particular distinction, the court has in effect
made electronic surveillance with consent of one of the parties a
purely investigatory tool, and has deprived the fruits of such inves-
tigation of any evidentiary standing. The court considered this re-
sult necessary when weighed against the right to privacy enjoyed by
a free people. 22
In the Standards, the presence or absence of consent of one of
the parties is treated as giving rise to separate sets of requirements.
Section Four of the Standards deals with interception with consent.
Section Five outlines the warrant procedure to be followed in the
absence of consent. A reading of these sections together yields the
conclusion that evidence obtained with the consent of one of the
parties is admissible, while the absence of consent gives rise to the
authorization requirements.
The interception of oral and wire communications is treated in
Title 18 of the United States Code.2 These provisions are essen-
tially the same in language and content as the Wisconsin statutes
interpreted in Arnold.24 While the Wisconsin court in Arnold has
construed identical statutory language to render evidence obtained
with the consent of one of the parties inadmissible, the United
States Supreme Court has held this type of evidence admissible. In
United States v. White,25 the Supreme Court held that the use of a
transmitter on the person of an informant produced evidence that
was admissible against the non-consenting defendant. Although, as
pointed out in Arnold, the White court could not agree on a single
opinion, the attitude expressed by the opinions in White are at least
provisionally helpful in ascertaining the federal law on this issue:
Inescapably one contemplating illegal activities must realize and
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police ...
Given the possibility that one of his colleagues is cooperating with
the police, it is only speculation to assert that the defendant's
utterances would be substantially different or his sense of security
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to
intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communi-
cation or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) and (4) are nearly identical to Wis. STAT. § 968.29(3) and (4).
25. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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any less if he also thought that the suspected colleague is wired
for sound ...
It is thus untenable to consider the activities and reports of
the police agent himself, though acting without a warrant, to be
"reasonable" investigative effort and lawful under the Fourth
Amendment but to view the same agent with a recorder or trans-
mitter as conducting an unreasonable and unconstitutional
search and seizure.26
At this point, the Court pointed out that its opinion was consistent
with the Title 18 provisions and the Standards section 4.1.?2
It is interesting to note that while the Wisconsin court in Arnold
made a detailed analysis of the Wisconsin statutes to arrive at its
holding, the Supreme Court in White made only passing reference
to the corresponding federal law in support of its position.
In the dissent to Arnold, Justice Hansen relied heavily on White
and the other federal decisions in this area to argue for the admis-
sibility of the evidence. The contention is that there is no constitu-
tional bar to the interception of oral communications with consent
of one of the parties, and further that the correct interpretation of
the statute would, since this type of interception is lawful, allow the
material thus obtained to be used in evidence.
CONCLUSION
In Arnold the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that informa-
tion obtained through the use of electronic surveillance with the
consent of one of the parties, but without court authorization, is
inadmissible against the non-consenting party. To arrive at this
decision, the court has apparently redefined the term "privileged
communications" to mean any communication uttered in private
conversation with another. Further, the court has strictly construed
sections 968.28 to 968.34 of theWisconsin Statutes, and has indi-
cated that for reasons of public policy and for the protection of
individual privacy, the limitations placed on the use of electronic
surveillance techniques will be strictly applied and enforced.
Since Arnold represents the first judicial pronouncement on this
subject since the passage of the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance
Control Law, the decision is a valuable indication of the court's
26. Id. at 753.
27. Id.
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views on this issue. In effect, the court has taken pains to limit the
operation of the statute by establishing these evidentiary limita-
tions.
FRANK THOMAS CRIVELLO
Insurance Law: Constitutionality of No-Fault in
Massachusetts-For the past several years, everyone involved in
negligence law has had to confront the question of reform in the
traditional automobile accident reparations system. There is wide-
spread agreement that some reform is needed, but at present a great
deal of energy is being expended over whether any of the proposed
"no-fault" systems of auto insurance is a proper means to reform.
First presented in the Columbia Plan,' no-fault was given its
recent impetus by the work of Professors Robert Keeton and Jef-
frey O'Connell,2 who laid a network of criticism at the feet of the
traditional tort-recovery system:
It pays too little, too late, unfairly distributed and at wasteful
cost, and through procedures that promote dishonesty and disre-
spect for the law. These are the symptoms of a fatally ill system.
It cannot survive.3
The general theme of the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection
PI'an is that an injured person is automatically reimbursed for his
economic loss-medical expenses and wage loss-regardless of who
is at fault. In return, the insured surrenders his right to bring a
traditional tort action, and consequently surrenders his right, in
most cases, to recover general damages (pain, suffering, enjoyment
of life, etc.). Variations on this theme have proliferated, differing
in the type of benefits offered, the maximum amounts available,
and the conditions under which tort recovery for general damages
would be allowed.4
I. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT
BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932).'
2. Professors of Law at Harvard University and Illinois University respectively, and
authors of BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
3. Keeton, Basic Protection-An Answer to the Automobile Insurance Crisis, 1 CONN.
L. REV. 13, 16 (1968).
4. At present, some form of no-fault insurance system has been institujed in Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon and South Dakota. These systems are
compared in THE BRIEF, Nov., 1971, published by the Section of Insurance, Negligence and
Compensation Law of the American Bar Association. There is also a comparison of the
basic no-fault proposals in TRIAL, Oct./Nov., 1970, at 8-9.
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